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Received 23.04.2024

Revised 25.08.2024

Accepted 27.09.2024

Retrieved from Iss. 116, P. 1, 2024

Pages 226 -234

  • 155 Views

Suggested citation

Kovalenko, N., & Malakhova, Yu. (2024). THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF USING GAME MODELS IN ECONOMY. Automobile Roads and Road Construction, (116.1), 226-234. https://doi.org/10.33744/0365-8171-2024-116.1-226-234

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF USING GAME MODELS IN ECONOMY

Natalia Kovalenko Yulia Malakhova

Abstract

The article examines the theoretical foundations and practical possibilities of applying game theory as an effective tool for analyzing and modeling economic processes. The main attention is paid to the classification of games by type of interaction, information completeness, number of participants and other parameters, which allows adapting these models to real economic problems. The key concepts of game theory, such as Nash equilibrium, dominant strategies, mixed strategies and coalition models, which are fundamental for analyzing the behavior of economic entities in a competitive environment, are studied. The paper analyzes the historical development of game theory, starting with the works of Emil Borel, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, who laid the foundation for the modern analysis of strategic decisions. The concepts of Nash equilibrium, Shapley value and other approaches are considered from the perspective of their practical application for solving problems of modeling market competition, coalition formation, resource allocation, pricing and auction analysis. Special attention is paid to the mathematical apparatus of game theory, in particular to normal, extensive and cooperative forms of game representation. Examples of modeling economic interaction are used, such as Cournot and Bertrand price competition, coalition agreements, analysis of negotiation strategies and risk management under uncertainty. The article also highlights the possibilities of game theory for predicting the behavior of market participants in conditions of information asymmetry. The use of game models allows enterprises not only to optimize behavioral strategies, but also to increase competitiveness, manage risks and ensure a fair distribution of resources. In cooperative games, the use of Shapley value contributes to the effective formation of coalitions and the distribution of winnings between participants. In non-cooperative scenarios, the Nash equilibrium helps to predict the actions of competitors and make optimal decisions. The results of the study have both theoretical value, as they provide a deep understanding of the strategic interaction of participants in economic processes. The conclusions obtained can be used to improve the effectiveness of management decisions in business, public administration and the financial sector

Keywords:

game theory, economic modeling, model, strategy, economy

References

  1. Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2024). E. Borel. The theory of play and integral equations with skew symmetric kernels. (1921). Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/biography/Emile-Borel.
  2. von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (2007). Theory of games and economic behavior (60th anniversary commemorative ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  3. Nash, J.F. (1951). Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics, 54(2), 286-295.
  4. Luce, R.D., & Raiffa, H. (1989). Games and decisions: Introduction and critical survey. New York: Dover Publications.
  5. Kuhn, H.W. (1953). Extensive games and the problem of information. In H.W. Kuhn & A.W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the theory of games (Vol. 2, pp. 193-216). Princeton: Princeton University Press. doi: 10.1515/9781400881970-012.
  6. Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37.
  7. Selten, R. (1965). Game-theoretic treatment of an oligopoly model with demand inertia. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324, 667-689.
  8. Shapley, L.S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H.W. Kuhn & A.W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the theory of games (Vol. 2, pp. 307-317). Princeton: Princeton University Press. doi: 10.1515/9781400881970-018.
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https://doi.org/10.33744/0365-8171-2024-116.1-226-234

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